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Abstract. Recent events have led to a burgeoning awareness on the
misuse of social media sites to affect political events, sway public opin-
ion, and confuse the voters. Such serious, hostile mass manipulation has
motivated a large body of works on bots/troll detection and fake news
detection, which mostly focus on classifying at the user level based on
the content generated by the users. In this study, we jointly analyze
the connections among the users, as well as the content generated by
them to Spot Coordinated Groups (SCG), sets of users that are likely to
be organized towards impacting the general discourse. Given their tiny
size (relative to the whole data), detecting these groups is computation-
ally hard. Our proposed method detects these tiny-clusters effectively
and efficiently. We deploy our SCG method to summarize and explain
the coordinated groups on Twitter around the 2019 Canadian Federal
Elections, by analyzing over 60 thousand user accounts with 3.4 million
followership connections, and 1.3 million unique hashtags in the content
of their tweets. The users in the detected coordinated groups are over 4x
more likely to get suspended, whereas the hashtags which characterize
their creed are linked to misinformation campaigns.
Keywords: social network, misinformation, graph mining
1 Introduction
Manipulation of online discourse through social media is a pressing global con-
cern [47]. Recently, the Special Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice pub-
lished their investigation into Russian ”Active Measures” social media campaign,
which confirmed an organized attempt at the state level to sow discord into the
U.S. political system through social media [28]. As an example, Twitter reported
possible engagement of 1.4 billion users with the suspected ”trolls” from the Rus-
sian government funded Internet Research Agency (IRC) [31], and it is believed
that this interference has swayed the 2016 US Presidential Election [1]. Such
activities aim to distort information space to confuse and distract voters, dis-
seminate propaganda and disinformation to foster divisions, and paralyze the
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Fig. 1. SCG detects 13 coordinated groups in the 2019 Canadian Federal Election
including multiple #MAGA groups.
decision making abilities of individuals [50]. The ultimate goals or motives of
these operations might be hard to interpret, but their effect on public opinion,
democracy and elections is clear [24,3].
The severity and scale of such operations motivated the social media giants
like Twitter and Facebook to update their site policies [38,11]. These updated
policies aim at tackling Information Operations - the suit of methods used to
influence others through the dissemination of propaganda and disinformation
[38,50], and Coordinated Inauthentic Activities - groups working together to
mislead people about who they are and what they are doing [11].
How can we monitor the information space proactively, identify such coordi-
nated activities at an early stage, to ensure a healthy democratic society? In this
paper we present SCG as a solution to this problem. SCG is a novel framework
that consists of modular components to study the activity in complex social
media space and identify groups that are impacting the information space in
an organized manner. In extreme cases, bots generated from the same script
behave in an almost identical or highly correlated manner [7], and trolls or sock-
puppets, who are being operated by the same person behind the scenes, exhibit
lock-step behavior [21]. More generally, SCG detects coordinated groups, mem-
bers of which amplify each others’ voice and boost each others’ influence, unlike
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Fig. 2. SCG summarizes Twitter dynamics of 69,709 accounts around 2019 Canadian
Election, providing a bird’s eye view of how detected coordinated groups (marked red)
engage in the overall discourse.
what is the norm among typical users. These are suspicious groups that need to
be further investigated by a human as detecting trolls is not a trivial task [32]
and political campaigns or activist groups might exhibit similar coordinated be-
haviour. SCG makes this subsequent investigation efficient by providing a group
level summarization and characterization.
We formulate this problem as finding tiny clusters (relative to the size of on-
line society) which introduce dense regions on coupled matrices of users’ activity
(content) and users’ interactions (connection). Through controlled synthetic ex-
periments, we demonstrate the difficulty of this regime for different off-the-shelf
contenders and the superior performance of our proposed SCG in terms of both
scalability and accuracy in recovering the injected tiny clusters.
We employ SCG to spot coordinated groups active around the 2019 federal
elections in Canada. In particular, we monitor the activity within Twitter, the
most commonly used platform to mobilize the public at the time of political un-
rest. Figure 1 shows the 13 coordinated groups flagged, and Figure 2 maps out
how these groups engage in the overall discourse. A key observation in Figure 1
is a block of multiple conservative groups that engage with both American con-
servative politics and Canadian election politics. This block encompasses Trump
#MAGA US groups as well as a domestic anti-Trudeau group. The different
popularity of hashtags used within each group reflects their different political
creed. The grey background shows the connections among these coordinated
groups. User accounts in these detected coordinated groups are more than four
times more likely to be suspended by Twitter. On the other end, several of the
hashtags these coordinated groups use, singled out by SCG, are linked to the mis-
information campaigns, in particular #notAbot and #TruedeauMustGo [26,30].
While these observations are important and help us better navigate the map of
twitter activity around this election, we want to emphasize that SCG provides a
general and novel tool for computational social science and could be applied to
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study and investigate suspiciously organized groups engaged around any given
topic in any online social network. The main contributions of our work can be
further summarized with respect to SCG’s modules, i.e.:
– SCG-map fuses user connections and the content they post to embed
large scale activity on social media in a holistic fashion
– SCG-flag effectively and efficiently detects tiny clusters of users who
are posting similar content and are densely connected
– SCG-signature and SCG-meso characterize and explain the group creeds
and how they engage with each other and the rest of users
– Scalability: SCG scales linearly with the number of edges in the graph
Deployment: our project was deployed to monitor the 2019 Canadian Fed-
eral Elections, the main election in Canada which indirectly elects the prime
minister (head of the majority party). The data collection process started in
April 2019, and the analysis process started in September 2019, and results were
first published October 2019 right before the election [49]. The findings were re-
ported before the election [18,33], and were corroborated by other independent
research groups and investigators afterwards [36,35]. We have released an inter-
active dashboard for better interpretation of our results and started a 2-years
close collaboration with political scientists as the followup of this study to un-
derstand the implications of the findings, deploy the improved system on future
upcoming elections, and be politically smart in the age of misinformation [19].
Reproducibility: the supplementary materials of SCG code (including code
to generate the synthetic data), extended version of the paper including appen-
dices that explain the details of method and experiments, as well as the visu-
alization dashboard to investigate the results are released5. The details of data
collection is also explained in the supplementary materials, however Twitter
policies do not allow re-sharing the crawled data.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we briefly review the related works on online misinformation
detection and general dense block detection methods.
2.1 Detecting Misinformation Online
Many recent works [1,27,50] analyze the vulnerabilities of social media to in-
formation operations and coordinated inauthentic activities, and relate them to
the clustering of politicized online information spaces. This phenomenon, de-
fined as ”echo-chambers”, describes the gathering of like-minded individuals on
online communities. As illustrated by Marwick et al [24], the defiance toward
traditional media from part of the population leads to the emergence of alterna-
tive (possibly biased or fake) news sources. Bovet et al. [3] showed that Twitter
5 https://sites.google.com/view/spg-exp
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Table 1. SCG matches all specs, while competitors miss one or more of the desired
features.
trolls tend to form small, politically biased groups that propagate misleading
information to normal users. Stewart et al [48] identified trolls as polarising el-
ements of echo-chambers, distorting the information space. Most past works on
online misinformation detection are largely limited to classifying user-generated
content or users, based on their activities [46,55,56,45]. Unlike these supervised
techniques, we take a novel unsupervised approach that jointly analyzes con-
tent and user connections, inspired by successful application of unsupervised
techniques in anomaly and fraud detection settings, for example, to detect fake
reviewers posted to artificially boost product ratings on E-commerce sites [16].
2.2 Dense Block Detection
Given the lockstep behavior exhibited by anomalous users, multiple dense block
detection methods have been designed for anomaly and fraud detection [42,41,43].
Finding exact cliques and quasi-cliques is shown to be NP-hard [22]. Classical so-
lutions for the clique problem can be categorized as exact enumerations [34], fast
heuristic enumerations [20] and bounded approximation algorithms [6], most of
which have runtime at least polynomial to the size of graph. Fraudar[16] is a no-
table example of scalable dense subgraph detection methods that finds subgraphs
with large average degree in the context of fraud/anomaly detection. Various ex-
tensions of dense subgraph detection include dense sub-tensor detection [42,43],
online dense sub-tensor detection [44], hierarchical dense subgraph detection
[54]. These methods are defined in a single mode whereas our method detects
coupled blocks which enforce dense substructures in coupled matrices/graphs as
discussed later in detail.
2.3 Graph Clustering
Dense subgraph detection is closely related to graph clustering or community de-
tection, which identifies clusters of densely connected nodes [52,17]. Two widely-
used community detection algorithms include Louvain [2], based on modularity
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optimization and Infomap [37], based on information compression. Table 1 puts
these methods in contrast with our proposed SCG.
On the other end, given a node embedding method, we can run any clus-
tering algorithm to recover network community structure. Network embedding
techniques aim to map nodes or subgraphs onto Euclidean space through possi-
bly learned functions on graphs. The most notable graph embedding techniques
are unsupervised GraphSAGE [15], node2vec [13] and attri2vec [53]. We show
in our experiments that these methods fail to recover tiny clusters effectively.
2.4 Finding Tiny Clusters
It is well-known that modularity optimization fails to identify clusters smaller
than a scale [10]. This resolution limit depends on the size of the network and the
interconnectedness of the clusters. Few works try to discover clusters of small
size in graphs [51,23]. Notably, pcv method [29] considers bipartite stochastic
block models and finds tiny clusters with theoretical guarantees. Our work takes
a similar notion of tiny cluster, but in a more general case of coupled matrices as
explained later. This combining of the different sources of information is proven
to be a necessity for better recovery of community structure [9].
3 Proposed Method
How can we find a coordinated group given millions of records of users’ activi-
ties in online social platforms? A group that consists of a relatively small set of
accounts that aim to increase their influence through following each other and
broadcasting similar messages. Looking at the connections among the user ac-
counts, a coordinated groups forms subgraph of much higher density than the
background. Similarly, dense subgraphs exits on the bipartite network of users in
coordinated groups and their messages/content they post. This can be captured
by artifacts such as hashtags or noun-phrases from the content and can also
be considered as attributes on the user nodes. Furthermore, these coordinated
groups are much smaller in size than naturally formed network communities or
clusters, and our interest is to recover exactly these tiny clusters, instead of the
global community structure of the network. More formally we define:
Definition 1 (coordinated group). Given user connection graph with adja-
cency matrix A ∈ {0, 1}n×n and user-attribute bipartite graph with biadjacency
matrix X ∈ {0, 1}n×d, a coordinated group is the set of user nodes that induce
high density on both A and similar attribute usage pattern on X.
To detect these coordinated groups, we propose SCG procedure. We design
SCG to be a modular framework that consists of four components: SCG-map
maps out large scale activity on social media by jointly embedding user con-
nections and the content they post; SCG-flag detects groups of users which
are close in the joint embedding which indicates that they are posting similar
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content and are also densely connected to each other; SCG-signature charac-
terizes the engagement of the coordinated groups and finds their group creed;
SCG-meso explains how different coordinated groups engage with each other
and the rest of the population.
More specifically, given user connection adjacency matrix A and user at-
tribute matrix X, SCG-map creates user embedding Z = Aφ(X) where φ
projects X on its first k left singular vectors through truncated singular value
decomposition. SCG-flag clusters Z using k-means and ranks the clusters by
their induced density on A. SCG-signature creates an ordering for all attributes
for each cluster, by computing the difference between in-cluster normalized us-
age frequency and global normalized usage frequency of each attribute. Finally,
SCG-meso measures the strength of interaction between two user clusters as
the amount of edges going though two user clusters, normalized by the product
of their respective sizes. The exact formulas used and details of the implemen-
tation are provided in the extended version of the paper made available in the
supplementary materials.
4 Experiments
In this section, we first verify the effectiveness and scalability of the first two
components of the proposed SCG method (SCG-map, SCG-flag) through a
set of synthetic experiments with builtin ground-truth, which approximate the
real-world problem and enable us to provide a quantitative evaluation. Next,
we discuss the observations provided by applying all four components of SCG
on scraped real-world Twitter data and provide several pieces of evidence on
the effectiveness and interpretability of the SCG in unveiling the dynamics of
coordinated groups around the 2019 Canadian federal election. We used user
followership as user connection graph, and hashtag usage as user attribute graph.
Due to time and budget constraints, we focus our analysis on data scraped from
Twitter around this particular event. Incorporating other social media platforms
and other events is part of the future works planned for this study.
4.1 Validation on Synthetic Data
Based on observation of our scraped dataset, real-world graphs are large, sparse
and have high-dimensional node attributes. To approximate real-world data
that has ground truths for coordinated groups, we generate synthetic attributed
graphs with similar characteristics but with injected coordinated groups that
serve as the groundtruth6. We compare different methods on how well they are
able to recover these injected coordinated groups.
Parameter settings: We generate eight coordinated groups with 20 nodes
and 20 attributes on differently sized graphs (2,000 to 30,000 nodes/attributes)
6 details and synthetic generation code are available in the supplementary materials
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to test the effectiveness and scalability of SCG. This gradually decreases the
ratio of coordinated nodes from 8% to 0.5% of the graph size, thus making the
detection progressively more challenging.
Baselines: Literature on unsupervised detection of coordinated groups is rel-
atively sparse, thus we carefully select unsupervised baselines from related lit-
erature: Infomap [37] and Louvain [2] from community detection; Fraudar [16]
and pcv [29] from dense subgraph or tiny cluster detection; node2vec [13], at-
tri2vec [53] and unsupervised GraphSAGE [15] from network embedding. As
summarized in SCG in Table 1, pcv baseline only considers content, the In-
fomap, Louvain, Fraudar and node2vec only consider connections, and the other
baselines incorporate both content and connections. For a subset of baselines
(node2vec, graphSAGE, attri2vec), we only run them on graphs with size up to
18,000 nodes due to time and hardware constraints.
Evaluation: To evaluate partitions (how well coordinated groups are sepa-
rated from the background and each other), we use Quality score in [29], given
k ground-truth clusters U1...k and s inferred clusters U˜1...s, and J(·, ·) as the
Jaccard similarity between two sets, the Quality score is:
Q =
1
k
k∑
i=1
max
j=1,...,s
J(Ui, U˜j) ∈ [0, 1] (1)
To evaluate the ability to classify nodes as belonging to a coordinated group
or not, we use the F1 score. We generate two instances of synthetic attributed
graph for each size, and do two runs on each instance and report the mean
performance across all four runs.
n = 2000 n = 6000 n = 10000 n = 14000 n = 18000 n = 22000 n = 26000 n = 30000
Quality F1 Quality F1 Quality F1 Quality F1 Quality F1 Quality F1 Quality F1 Quality F1
Louvain 3.92 14.81 2.70 4.91 2.43 2.02 2.29 0.56 2.33 0.75 2.12 0.47 1.97 0.00 2.07 0.00
Infomap 11.11 0.00 11.11 0.00 11.11 0.00 11.11 0.00 11.11 0.00 11.11 0.00 11.11 0.00 11.11 0.00
node2vec 3.52 14.81 3.35 6.52 5.74 11.63 6.21 13.56 3.38 0.61 - - - - - -
attri2vec 3.93 0.00 4.91 0.55 5.69 0.00 6.66 0.00 6.5 0.00 - - - - - -
GraphSAGE 3.36 0.00 2.22 0.00 2.06 0.00 1.85 0.00 1.72 0.00 - - - - - -
pcv 5.60 0.00 2.42 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.79 0.00 1.70 0.00 1.58 0.00 1.62 0.00 1.60 0.00
Fraudar - 15.64 - 5.21 - 3.15 - 2.26 - 1.76 - 1.44 - 1.22 - 1.06
SCG 11.39 64.97 13.19 86.72 13.33 97.66 13.44 99.53 13.27 100.00 11.00 75.00 10.72 75.00 13.41 100.00
Table 2. SCG consistently and significantly outperforms baselines in terms of Quality
and F1 score on synthetic graphs.
Performance analysis: Figure 3 illustrates that principal components of
SCG-map embeddings for normal versus coordinated nodes are better separated
compared to the other embeddings methods. This is an example embedding on
synthetic graph of size 12,000. Table 2 reports the full results for all the baselines
and settings. We can see that SCG outperforms baselines significantly, especially
when the coordinated groups only occupy a small fraction of the graph (0.5%).
This indicates that the general community detection or clustering methods are
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Fig. 3. SCG-map provides better separation for normal versus coordinated nodes.
Fig. 4. SCG-map is significantly faster than most baselines: more than 10,000 times
faster than node2vec when graph size is 18,000. The inset plot shows the same com-
parison focused on the scalable algorithms.
not appropiate for this setting as they are designed with different assumptions,
e.g. balanced clusters. The pcv baseline which is specifically designed for detect-
ing tiny clusters fails as it is not able to incorporate the connections and only
operates on one mode of the data, i.e. user contents. Furthermore, as shown in
Figure 4, the runtime of SCG-map is more than 10,000 times faster than some
baseline. We can show that SCG scales linearly with the number of nonzero
entries in A and X given some assumptions. An in depth discussion on the time
complexity of SCG is provided in the supplementary materials.
4.2 Results on Real-World Data
Data collection: Since April 2019, we started collecting tweets related to the
2019 Canadian federal election through the Twitter streaming API filtered by a
seed hashtag set based on significant political events in Canada (list of the hash-
tags used and details are provided in the supplementary materials). We collected
sampled tweets between April and October 2019 and developed custom scraping
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pipeline to scrape all followers for Twitter users who used these hashtags. For
each user, we tracked all hashtags usage in his or her sampled tweets and created
an attribute vector where each entry is the frequency of using a specific hashtag.
For cross validation, we also tracked whether users been suspended between April
and October, and collected their Botometer[8] score from a commonly used API.
This API measures the extent to which a Twitter account exhibits similarity to
the known characteristics of social bots based on user-generated meta-data, ac-
tivities, and content, without structural information about his or her follower
network. For more details, please refer to the supplementary materials.
Data Representation and Preprocessing: We filter out users who do not
have any followers or followees, and obtain a directed attributed graph G that
has n = 69, 709 nodes, |E| = 3, 480, 145 edges and d = 1, 329, 385 unique hashtags
as node attributes. Let J denote set of all hashtags in our data (|J | = d), and I
denote the set of all users (|I| = n). We create adjacency matrix A ∈ {0, 1}n×n
from user followership and attribute matrix X ∈ Nn×d from user hashtag usage.
In the following sections, we consistently use n to denote the number of users and
d the number of attributes. We apply doubly-normalized TF-IDF to give more
significance to uncommon hashtags, because entries of X are highly skewed:
X∗ij =
n∑
i′∈I X
b
i′j
0.5 + 0.5Xij
maxj′∈J Xij′
(2)
where Xb = JX > 0K is a binarized attribute matrix.
Results Overview A total of 13 coordinated groups are detected by SCG in
our collected data. We visualize them in Figure 5, which show a clear block
structure for both A and X on indices induced by these groups. This indicates
the ability for SCG-map and SCG-flag to discover tightly connected user groups,
each engaging with similar sets of hashtags.
Fig. 5. SCG-map finds coordinated groups of users exhibiting block-diagonal structure
in both the adjacency (left) and attribute matrix (right) on the twitter data.
Comparing with baselines We compare SCG with Fraudar and pcv, which
are the only baseline methods that scale to our data size given our time and
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Fig. 6. SCG-map puts users of the same political creed (related group creeds) close
together. Here nodes are the individual users, size of each node corresponds to its
individual engagement in the Canadian politics. Nodes are colored the same if they
belong to the same cluster.
hardware constraints. Since no ground truth of coordinated groups is available
for real-world data, we compare the suspension index and bot influence index
of detected coordinated groups as a proxy; which are defined below. Given s ∈
{0, 1}n to where si = 1 if user i has been suspended between April and October,
and 0 otherwise, we define Suspension Index fS of a set of user accounts Ic
to measure the concentration of suspended accounts in this set relative to the
background, i.e.:
fS(Ic) =
∑
i∈Ic si/|Ic|∑
i∈I si/|I|
(3)
Given b ∈ Rn containing collected Botometer scores and f ∈ Zn containing
number of followers for users in our dataset, we define Bot Influence Index fB of
a set of user accounts Ic to measure their average level of estimated bot influence,
i.e.:
fB(Ic) =
∑
i∈Ic bi log(1 + fi)
|Ic| (4)
As shown in Table 3, all methods perform better than uniformly sampling
a set of users to be coordinated, but SCG is the clear winner. It detected co-
ordinated nodes that are over four times likely to be suspended than a random
sample and has the highest bot influence index, which is directly related to our
definition of coordinated groups - set of users that boost their influence in an
inauthentic fashion. Although both metrics are not designed from ground-truth
knowledge of existing coordinated groups, they show that SCG finds interesting
groups for further study, some of which we investigated in Figure 7. Note in the
figure that such high concentration of accounts that contain suspended users,
posting politically one-sided (anti-Trudeau), and potentially offensive content
right before the Canadian election in 2019 is intriguing.
12 Junhao Wang et al.
Suspension Index Bot Influence Index
Fraudar 1.297 1.645
SPG 4.472 1.905
pcv 1.625 1.890
Random 1 0.918
Table 3. SCG detects users in coordinated groups that have the highest suspension
index and bot influence index.
Discussions and Main Observations Figure 6 visualizes SCG-map node
embeddings for users in our dataset using UMAP [25]. The sizes of the points in
the figure correspond to their individual engagement in discussions around Cana-
dian politics (Equation 6). Background nodes, those that reside in the largest
cluster are plotted as grey with a lighter shade. Overlayed on each colored cluster
of users is the group creed created by SCG-signature.
More specifically we define the significance of hashtag j ∈ J denoted by fS ,
as the mean doubly-normalized TF-IDF value across all users, i.e.:
fS(j) =
∑
i∈I X
∗
ij
n
(5)
We set 1,000 hashtags with the highest significance be the set of Significant
Hashtags JS . The overlap of this set and our seed hashtag set (and their variants
by changing the case of letters) gives the set of Significant Canadian Hashtags,
which we denote by JC . We also define Individual Engagement - each user’s
engagement with Canadian politics, denoted by fe, as the ratio of (at-least-once)
usage of hashtags in JC by that user, i.e.:
∀i ∈ I : fe(i) =
∑
j∈JC X
b
ij
|JC | (6)
We observe that SCG-map embeds groups with similar group creeds close to
each other, thus forming an informative map of Twitter : top middle occupied
by American conservative groups indicated by #KAG; the center by interna-
tional groups signified by #Chinese, #Iranian, #Paris; top right by pro-Scheer
(#Scheer4PM) and anti-Trudeau (#TrudeauMustGo) groups; the middle right
by anti-Scheer (#ScheerWeakness) groups; the middle left by climate activist
groups, evidenced by #climate and #AmazonRainforest.
The adjacency matrix with block-diagonal structure induced by the detected
coordinated groups is visualized in Figure 1, where we observe siloed groups as
well as interacting ones, which are likely American conservative groups. Another
observation is that the potential American conservative group signatured by
#WWG1WGA (Where We Go One, We Go All) which contains suspended users
interacts with two smaller groups with the hashtag signatures of #LavScam and
#Scheer4PM, which are likely Canadian anti-Trudeau and pro-Scheer groups.
This interaction could be considered a potential foreign involvement on the Cana-
dian 2019 Election, which is discovered independently by other researchers after
SCG 13
Fig. 7. Verification with external indicators: SCG-map and SCG-flag detect an in-
triguing coordinated group: 3 suspended users and multiple other unsuspended users
simultaneously tweet politically one-sided (anti-Trudeau) and potentially offensive con-
tent.
our study [36,35]. Studying the impact/influence of these groups is one of our
planned future studies.
Figure 2 illustrates the detected coordinated groups, plotted as red, and
non-coordinated clusters that are not the background are plotted as colored
points. The sizes of these points are proportional to their cluster engagement
(Equation 7). We can see that the coordinated groups are highly engaged with
Canadian politics, evidenced by their node sizes, and are close to each other in
the embedding space. Specifically, we define Cluster Engagement with Canadian
politics for a set of users, Ic, as their scaled average individual engagements with
Canadian politics, i.e.:
fE(Ic) = log(|Ic|)
∑
i∈Ic fe(i)
|Ic| (7)
We have observed that within these coordinated groups, the empirical like-
lihood of being suspended between April and October is over four times more
likely compared to a random sample. Many users in these coordinated groups
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are highly similar to those suspended accounts. We observe that the content
posted by these groups are mostly offensive. In Figure 7 for example, in the
large connected component in one of our detected coordinated group, we iden-
tified several accounts (colored black) that generated politically one-sided and
potentially offensive content similar to suspended accounts (colored red): some
sampled content from these accounts are appended to the figure. While SCG-
flag spot these users who are behaving similarly to the suspended users, these
accounts were still active at the time of our analysis.
Looking at the the group creed (signature hashtag) for each group on the
Twitter maps in Figure 6 and 2 discovered by SCG-signature, we get a con-
cise characterization of the results and explains the complex structure through
which these groups are engaged in Canadian politics. Furthermore, group creeds
for coordinated groups highly overlap with clusters that exhibit the highest ra-
tio of suspended users, including #Iranian, #KAG2020, #notAbot, #Trudeau-
MustGo, and #Scheer4PM. This makes SCG a useful tool for spotting suspicious
messages on social platforms that could have been manipulated by coordinated
groups. We also verify that two of these hashtags discovered by SCG-signature
and SCG-flag (#notAbot, #TrudeauMustGo) are later confirmed to be linked
to misinformation campaigns [30,26]. These two hashtags have so far been the
primarily used hashtags against the 2019 Canadian election, and both have been
detected before mainstream media coverage. This makes SCG-signature a pow-
erful tool to assist in detecting trending misinformation campaigns before they
make a significant mark.
SCG-meso quantifies the strength of the connection between all pairs of
clusters, and thus enables the study of their potential influence. In Figure 2,
the link between two clusters is plotted with line width proportional to their
SCG-meso interaction; those that are connected to the detected 13 coordinated
groups are colored red, and other links are plotted as green. We observe from
Figure 2 that two sets of clusters have observable interactions (manifested as lines
among points) among them. They are respectively represented by two sets of
group creeds: (1) #KAG (Keep America Great), $AmericaFirst, #WWG1WGA
(Where We Go One, We Go All) and their variants which are related to American
conservative politics; and (2) #Scheer4PM, #TrudeauMustGo, #LavScam and
their variants which are related to Canadian election politics. Future studies will
focus on the expanding this group-level study of detected coordinated clusters.
A less concerning but still interesting observation is that SCG-flag identifies
one out of four groups signatured by #Iranian, where two out of the four groups
exhibit the highest suspension index. However, no significant connections are
going outside of these three groups to other parts of the graph. Inspection of
the users’ tweets in these clusters reveals that the accounts in these groups are
primarily concerned with immigration issues and are mostly created in Febru-
ary 2019, right before the passing of Bill 21, a Bill in Quebec that sets out a
framework for values test for skilled workers, which impacts immigration. The
observed strong connection within a set of groups but weak or no connection to
other parts of a graph could be a sign of a failed amplifying strategy.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented SCG, which discovers, characterizes, and explains
coordinated groups in social media platforms. SCG is
Holistic: SCG jointly models users’ connection and content, hence it can
provide the bird’s eye view of the activities on social platforms.
Effective: SCG performs significantly better than baselines on synthetic
data with planted tiny clusters, and can discover intriguing coordinated groups
in real-world data.
Characterization: SCG provides a concise characterization of who (coordi-
nated groups) does what (propagating group creeds) to whom (normal groups)
on large complex social networks.
Scalable: SCG scales linearly with the number of edges of the graph with
reasonable assumptions.
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6 Appendix
In this section, we provide details of problem, methods, experiments and algo-
rithm scalability. We also created an interactive visual demo based on SCG to
enable the interpretability of our work. Source code for synthetic experiment and
URL for interactive visual demo can be retrieved at https://sites.google.com/
view/spg-exp. We run all experiments on Acer Predator Triton 700 PT715-
51-732Q Notebook with Intel Core i7-7700HQ (2.80 GHz), 32GB DDR4, and
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 8GB. The budget for collecting individual tweet
history that spans multiple months and writing custom scraping pipeline to
scrape the full follower network of the large number of users is 5,000 Canadian
dollars.
6.1 Problem Motivation
We define Coordinated Group to be (1) a small set of densely connected social
media accounts that aim to increase their influence through (2) following each
other and broadcasting a similar set of messages.
(1) Small network: Quoting from the report of U.S. Department of Justice’s
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election:
”Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and per-
sonas on different U.S. social media platforms; A number of IRA employees
assigned to the Translator Department served as Twitter specialists; IRA special-
ists operated certain Twitter accounts to create individual U.S. personas”
[28], evidence suggests that the size of the coordinated group is small and op-
erationalized, and the total number of employees operating the social media
accounts is limited by hiring capacity of the underlying organization.
(2) Following each other and broadcasting messages: According to in-
vestigation lead by the Special Counsel for the United States Department of
Justice, Russian ”Active Measures” Social Media Campaign executed by Inter-
net Research Agency, LLC (IRA) was capable of reaching millions of U.S. citizens
through their social media accounts on Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr, YouTube,
and Twitter, by the end of the 2016 U.S. election [28]. More specifically, IRA
created inauthentic social media accounts operated by a small team of employees
as well as automated bots starting as early as 2014, in the names of U.S. citizens,
fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups, in order to garner followers
and influence in online discourse and broadcast messages with hidden political
agenda. Employee-operated IRA social media accounts attracted massive follow-
ers: ”United Muslims of America” Facebook group had over 300,000 followers;
@jenn abrams - a Twitter account claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter
had over 70,000 followers. Bot-operated network of accounts also gained consider-
able influence during the election (approximately 1.4 million people on Twitter)
[28].
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6.2 Details of Problem Formulation
Formally, we model the users as a binary attributed graph G(A,X), where
A ∈ {0, 1}n×n is the adjacency matrix that encodes connections among users,
and X ∈ {0, 1}n×d is the binary attribute matrix that encodes connections
between users and content. We assume both A and X can be modelled by
Bernoulli random variables in some space set, whose distribution can be speci-
fied through latent groups on the rows and columns. Let node affiliation matrix
Z ∈ {0, 1}n×g : ∑dk=1 Zik = 1 be a binary matrix that encodes hard parti-
tion of n nodes into g non-overlapping latent node groups, and attribute af-
filiation matrix W ∈ {0, 1}d×m be a binary matrix that encodes hard parti-
tion of d attributes into m possibly overlapping latent attribute groups. Let
P ∈ [0, 1]g×g store the means of a grid of Bernoulli random variables where
Pkk′ = p(Aii′ = 1 | ZikZi′k′ = 1), and similarly Q ∈ [0, 1]g×m where Qkl =
p(Xij = 1 | ZikWjl = 1). Pkk′ represents the probability of having an edge
between two nodes belonging to latent node groups k and k′, respectively, while
Qkl represents the probability that a user from latent node group k has attribute
from latent attribute group l. Assume A and X are conditionally independent
given Z,W and θ = {P,Q}, thus:
p(A,X|Z,W,θ) = p(A|Z,W,θ)p(X|Z,W,θ) =∏
ii′kk′
f(Aii′ ; Pkk′)
ZikZi′k′
∏
ijkl
f(Xij ; Qkl)
ZikWkl
where f(a; b) = ab(1− a)1−b
(8)
Given such a latent variable model we define a coordinated group to be a
latent node group k ∈ {1, · · · , g} that is small, well connected within itself, and
share at least one small latent attribute group l ∈ {1, · · · ,m} that nodes in
group k have with high probability. Formally, we defined as:
Definition 2 (block coordinated group). Given threshold parameters for
group-induced subgraph edge probabilities p∗ ∈ [0, 1], q∗ ∈ [0, 1], and group size
bounds 7 sh ≥ sl ∈ N, th ≥ tl ∈ N, a latent node group k ∈ {1, · · · g} of s nodes
is called a coordinated group with shared latent attribute group l ∈ {1, · · · ,m}
of t attributes if it satisfies the following conditions:
– Size Condition (groups are small):
sl ≤ s ≤ sh and tl ≤ t ≤ th
– Edge Probability Condition (group is well connected and attribute is
likely):
Pkk ≥ p∗ and Qkl ≥ q∗.
7 sh is in the order of O(n
) and th is in the order of O(d
) for some  > 0 to confine
coordinated groups to be tiny clusters
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6.3 Details of Methods
We model the activity on social networks (Twitter, Facebook) as a binary at-
tributed graph G(A,X), which potentially contains coordinated groups as de-
fined in Definition 2. In cases where it is more optimal to have non-binary at-
tributes, we relax the binary constraint. We design SCG to be a modular frame-
work that consists of four components: SCG-map maps out large scale activity
on social media by jointly embedding user connections and the content they
post; SCG-flag detects groups of users which are posting similar content and
are also densely connected to each other, a common indicator of misinformation
campaigns, which we call coordinated groups; SCG-signature characterizes the
engagement of the coordinated groups and finds their group creed; SCG-meso
explains how different coordinated groups engage with each other and the rest
of the population.
Specifically, SCG-map first jointly embeds nodes and their attributes of
G(A,X) to low-dimensional Euclidean vectors Z by preserving one-hop neigh-
borhood structural similarity and attribute information, which we view as a form
of data fusion, where multiple sources of data are integrated to produce more
consistent, accurate and useful information than using a single source [14]. We
design four variants of SCG-map, which we call SCG-map-original (referred to
as SCG-map is the main paper), SCG-map-augment, SCG-map-lanigiro, SCG-
map-tnemgua (abbreviated as fo, fa, fl, ft), based on two fundamental building
blocks: low-rank approximation of matrix denoted by projection operator ΠK ,
where K specifies the resulting dimension after projection; and message passing
on graph denoted by operator M(· ; A), where A encodes adjacency matrix of
the graph. The variants differ in the order with which to apply Π and M , as
well as whether to apply augmentation T on A:
fo(A,X) = Zo = M(ΠK(X); A)
fa(A,X) = Za = M(ΠK(X);T (A))
fl(A,X) = Zl = ΠK(M(X; A))
ft(A,X) = Zt = ΠK(M(X;T (A)))
(9)
Arbitrary ΠK ,M, T can be plugged in to produce a mapping from G(A,X) to
Z. In this work, we chose ΠK to project input matrix on its first K left singular
vectors, and chose M to use summation aggregator for graph message passing,
and chose T to augment input adjacency matrix by adding self-loops to all nodes.
For example, ft materializes as ΠK(AX+X). ΠK can be efficiently implemented
by augmented Lanczos bidiagonalization algorithm [4].
The functional form of SCG-map, especially fl is motivated by (1) interpret-
ing D˜ = M(X,A) as the extension of degree matrix to binary attributed graph,
where D˜ij represents number of neighbors with attribute j that node i has; (2)
interpreting rows of D˜ to be drawn from a mixture of discrete probability dis-
tributions on Nd. It has been proven that for a matrix of size n× d whose rows
are vectors sampled from a mixture of d-dimensional discrete distributions or
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continuous distributions with subgaussian tails, under certain conditions, apply-
ing low-rank projection and then l22 clustering can partition these row vectors to
their respective generating distributions exactly with high probability, even if the
partition size is tiny - in the order of O(n),  > 0 [12]. Therefore, our SCG-map
followed by SCG-flag can be viewed as the exact recovery of tiny user clusters
with similarly attributed neighbors with high probability, echoing the intuition
of coordinated groups in Definition 2. Furthermore, since such procedure works
for both discrete and continuous data, attribute matrix X can be relaxed to be
non-binary.
SCG-flag detects coordinated groups in G by first constructing clusters
through minibatch KMeans - a scalable centroid-based clustering optimized by
stochastic gradient descent [40]. In principle, however, other clustering algo-
rithms can be used. For example, when the ground truth number of clusters is
not known, density-based clustering can be used. Definition 2 states that for a
cluster to be a coordinated group, it needs to satisfy edge probability condition
and size condition for both A and X. Note, however, to check both conditions
on X requires inferring the underlying generative parameters of the binary at-
tributed graph, which is not the approach taken in our work, and we leave it for
future work. Thus, we only check edge probability condition and size condition
for A to flag a cluster to be a coordinated group, and check only edge probability
condition for A in cases where the size threshold is unknown.
SCG-signature creates a concise interpretable group signature for each clus-
ter generated by SCG-flag which we call group creed, by defining a metric φ
over the set of attributes J given nodes Ic of a cluster, to rank the informative-
ness of each attribute in terms of uniquely describing node cluster at Ic.
∀j ∈ J : φ(j; Ic) =
∑
i∈Ic Xij∑
j′∈J
∑
i∈Ic Xij′
−
∑
i∈I Xij∑
j′∈J
∑
i∈I Xij′
(10)
φ(j; Ic) shows the local versus global discrepancy of usage frequency for attribute
j. Therefore, argmaxj∈Jφ(j; Ic) is the group signature (group creed) for cluster
Ic, and it gives a concise summarization for constructed clusters from SCG-flag,
both coordinated and normal ones.
SCG-meso defines a symmetrical pairwise metric ψ between two sets of
nodes Ic and Ip:
ψ(Ic, Ip) =
∑
i∈Ic
∑
i′∈Ip Aii′
|Ic||Ip| (11)
ψ(Ic, Ip) captures the strength of the interaction between nodes in Ic and Ip,
thus providing a meso-level view of the data.
The four components of SCG above make it a powerful tool for joint coor-
dinated group detection and data summarization on attributed graphs. Next,
we demonstrate its effectiveness, scalability, and interpretability with synthetic
experiments and real-world data applications.
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6.4 Details of Experiments on Synthetic Data
Parameter settings: For threshold parameters, we set p∗ = q∗ = 0.01, sl =
tl = 10, sh = th = 80, essentially limiting coordinated group-induced subgraph
to be appropriately sized with edge probability higher than 0.01. For generative
parameters, we set P ∈ {0.025, 0.015, 0.01, 0.005}9×9 where Pkk = 0.025,Pkk′ =
0.015,Pk9 = P9k = 0.01,P99 = 0.005 for k, k
′ ∈ [1 . . . 8], k 6= k′. We set Q ∈
{0.025, 0.005}9×9 where Qll = 0.025 for l ∈ [1 . . . 8] and other entries of Q to be
0.005. For node affiliation matrix Z ∈ {0, 1}n×9, we set Zi1 = 1 for i ∈ [1 . . . 20],
Zi2 = 1 for i ∈ [21 . . . 40], . . . , Zi9 = 1 for i ∈ [161 . . . n], and other entries of
Z to be 0. This encodes 8 small latent groups that induce subgraphs on A with
higher edge probabilities which correspond to coordinated groups, and 1 large
latent group with low edge probability, which corresponds to normal users. Note
that each coordinated group also has denser connections with other coordinated
groups and normal users than the connections among normal users themselves.
For attribute affiliation matrix W ∈ {0, 1}d×9, we set Wj9 = 1 ∀j ∈ [1 . . . d],
and for each l ∈ [1 . . . 8], we create index set Jl : |Jl| = 40 by uniformly random
sampling without replacement from [1 . . . d], and set Wjl = 1 for j ∈ Jl. This
encodes 8 small possibly overlapping latent groups and 1 large latent group that
contains all attributes, meaning all attributes (hashtags) are equally likely to be
used by non-coordinated nodes.
Evaluation: When generating the data, we assign a label for each node where
labels 1 to 8 denotes which coordinated group a node belongs to, and if a node
does not belong to any coordinated group, we assign label 0. We also assign
a binary label to each node that indicates whether the node belongs to any
coordinated group or not.
Baselines: Infomap, Louvain, node2vec only run on adjacency matrix A and
cannot utilize attribute matrix X; pcv only runs on bipartite graph, thus only X
and not A; we run Fraudar on A; our method SCG, attri2vec, and GraphSAGE
run on both A and X. For algorithms that return partition of both nodes and
attributes (pcv), we evaluate partition accuracy by the Quality score between
ground truth and inferred partition, and evaluate classification accuracy of nodes
being in coordinated group or not by assigning estimated binary labels to nodes
through sequentially checking (1) the edge probability condition for A; (2) the
size condition for A; (3) both conditions for X, and report the best F1 score
from the three. For algorithms that return partition of nodes (Infomap, Louvain,
SCG), we follow the procedure above but do not check for (3) For algorithms
that return embedding vectors of nodes (node2vec, attri2vec, GraphSAGE), we
first apply minibatch KMeans clustering with number of cluster equal to 9 and
create node labels, and then proceed as those mentioned above. For an algorithm
that only returns the anomalous set of nodes (Fraudar), we only report the F1
score. Any algorithm that already has a centroid-based clustering step involved
(pcv), we replace it with minibatch KMeans for fairness of comparison. For any
algorithm that has an embedding component, if the chosen implementation has
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a default setting that is consistently used or if the original publication explicitly
recommends a particular setting, we set the embedding dimension accordingly.
Otherwise, we set it to 10 for fairness of comparison.
6.5 Details of Experiments on Real-World Data
Data collection: The seed set of hashtags are in Table 4. Using Google Cloud
virtual machine instance, we started to use Twitter streaming API to collect
real-time sampled tweets that contain these hashtags since April. In the mean-
time, our custom scraping pipeline scanned the real-time tweets and initiated
massively parallel jobs to scrape the full follower network (not easily accessible
through Twitter API) for each user in that dataset, as well as large-size sample
of individual tweet history that spans multiple months. Till October, the size of
scraped data was around 2-3 terabytes before filtering. The scraping, cleaning
and processing of this dataset have been both labor and capital intensive.
#cdnpoli #canpoli
#cpc #SenCA
#cdnleft #pttory
#ptbloc #gpc
#crtc #goc
#BlackFaceTrudeau #TrudeauMustResign
#BlackFace #BrownFace
#ScheerLies #elexn43
#NotasAdvertised #TrudeauTheHyprocrite
#ptlib #lpc
#ndp #lavscam
#ptndp #ptgreen
#cdnsen #cpac
#CdesCom #TrudeauBlackFace
#BrownFaceTrudeau #TrudeauWorstPM
#Scheer #Andysresume
#elxn43 #elxn19
Table 4. Hashtags used for crawling the data which are related to 2019 Canadian
Federal Election.
Applying SCG-map We chose SCG-map-original for its efficiency. Compared
with synthetic data, some of the users in the twitter data do not have any
followers, and simple message-passing is not optimal. Thus we relax SCG-map
by message-passing on both A and AT and then concatenate to form final node
embedding H˜. We set the projected dimension K of ΠK to be 100, thus resulting
in H˜ ∈ Rn×200:
H˜ =
(
fo(A,X
∗), fo(AT ,X∗)
)
(12)
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Applying SCG-flag Compared with synthetic experiments, both ground truth
number of clusters as well as threshold parameters for coordinated groups defined
in Definition 2 are not known. Therefore we applied a clustering algorithm that
does not require the knowledge of the number of clusters and then applied elbow
method [39] to determine p∗, the minimum edge probability of cluster-induced
subgraph on A. We selected HDBSCAN [5], a density-based clustering algorithm
that does not require the knowledge of number of clusters, and set p∗ = 0.05
through elbow heuristics as in Figure 8.
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Fig. 8. Given cluster index sorted by induced subgraph edge probability on A, we
apply elbow method to identify p∗ = 0.05 for coordinated groups
Applying SCG-signature Naive application of SCG-signature on the set of
all hashtags J would result in uninformative signatures, especially since |J | is
large. Therefore, we apply SCG-signature to the set of Significant Hashtags JS .
Thus, given the set of all users I, the group signature (creed) for the cluster of
users Ic is argmaxj∈JSφ(j; Ic) where
∀j ∈ JS : φ(j; Ic) =
∑
i∈Ic Xij∑
j′∈JS
∑
i∈Ic Xij′
−
∑
i∈I Xij∑
j′∈JS
∑
i∈I Xij′
(13)
Applying Fraudar and pcv We run Fraudar on the adjacency matrix A of
follower network. We run pcv on the transformed attribute matrix X∗, and
convert non-binary labels returned from pcv to binary labels in the same way
as in synthetic experiments. We set embedding dimension of pcv to be 100,
clustering module of pcv to be HDBSCAN, and p∗ = 0.05, same as SCG.
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6.6 Scalability of SCG
Let | · | be the number of nonzero entries in a sparse matrix. We assume input
matrices A ∈ {0, 1}n×n,X ∈ Rn×d are sparse and their number of nonzero
entries are in the same order: O(|X|) ≈ O(|A|), and assume the projection
dimension K in SCG-map, number of inferred clusters m in SCG-flag, batch-
size B and number of steps T for any stochastic iterative algorithms used in
SCG are much smaller than |A|, i.e. K  |A|,m |A|, B  |A|, T  |A|. We
analyze the time complexity of SCG composed of (1) SCG-map-original, (2)
SCG-flag clustering based on minibatch KMeans, (3) SCG-flag thresholding,
SCG-signature and SCG-meso implemented with hash map through a constant
number of passes of all nonzero entries of sparse matrices. The time complexity
for SCG can be calculated as:
– SCG-map-original: First applying augmented Lanczos bidiagonalization
algorithm [4] to calculate ΠK(X) takes O(T |X|K + K3 + c) ≈ O(|X|) ≈
O(|A|). Next, for message passing operation M(ΠK(X),A) where ΠK(X) ∈
Rn×K is dense and A is sparse, the time complexity is O(|A|K) ≈ O(|A|) for
standard implementation using Sparse Basic Linear Algebra Subprograms
(BLAS) Library.
– SCG-flag clustering: Applying minibatch KMeans to SCG-map-original
node embeddings Z ∈ Rn×K take O(KBmT ) < O(|A|).
– Other components: Since they are implemented to take constant num-
ber of passes through all nonzero entries of input sparse matrices, the time
complexity is O(|A|).
Therefore, the resulting time complexity of SCG is O(|A|), thus scaling lin-
early with the number of edges in the graph.
6.7 SCG Interactive Visualization Dashboard
As one of the future works of this paper, we are building an interactive tool
to share our findings with collaborators in political science and journalism. The
demo URL can be accessed at https://sites.google.com/view/spg-exp.
